We have won the war! Listen. That has a ring, a motivational power to it. Pride is coupled with the statement; “surviving an epidemic” reminds one of desperate times. Make no mistake: the conflict with the zombies is indeed a war. They are out to destroy humanity, even if it is not a conscious decision. Labelling the Zombie War as anything else diminishes many heroes’ sacrifices, fails to contextualize the tough decisions made, and completely disregards the unity needed to defeat the virus. To win a war, one needs to attack. As the leader of a country, this is why I would vote to attack during the Honolulu Conference.
This call to attack is more than just demagoguery. It provides the best solution to the zombie apocalypse in multiple areas. Tactically, the alternative to not attacking is “remain[ing] safe and sedentary while our enemy simply rot[s] away” (Brooks 265), but General D’Ambrosia states, “[l]ock a hundred of them in a room and three years later they’ll come out just as deadly” (272). Attacking really is the only choice because the threat will remain if nothing is done. The War started with only a few zombies; not attacking now would allow the process to start much more rapidly than before because people would undoubtedly become infected due to the many zombies present. Moreover, militaries can only be content with a stalemate for so long. A lack of a clear goal (such as reclaiming a particular city) would soon develop into a distrust of leadership. If our military gives up, then even the safe zones will be in jeopardy.
There are many social and political benefits, as well. For example, reclaiming entire cities and allowing people to return back to their homes gives people hope. Victories like these–even if some defeats are present–would fix the problem of ADS (Asymptomatic Demise Syndrome). Without noticeable progress, people will “simply go to sleep one night and not wake up the next morning…because…it could only bring more suffering” (159). Politically, this would also set the stage for future governments because people will have faith in their leaders. They will see their government as an entity that actually brought positive change instead of one that cowered in the face of danger. If the world stays on the defensive, then people will always have a lingering question about why their governments have not yet done anything about the situation. Stagnation is simply not an option for a country either.
Perhaps a criticism of attacking the zombies is that we “risk even more lives, suffer even more [casualties]” (265). War has a price, however, and the people fighting in the fields understand the consequences. They are willing to sacrifice themselves for the sake of humanity, and by going on the offensive, we are valuing their sacrifice. The offensive will not be a reckless charge into danger, however. It will take the form of the “Reinforced Square” (280) formation that Todd describes in great detail. It is effective, deadly, and replicable. Labeling an offensive as dangerous and foolish is misguided. Perhaps the old way of fighting could be described as such, but the new offensive will be calculated. A loss of life would be tragic in this strategy, not just the norm.
Seeing that going on the offensive makes sense tactically, socially, and politically, I would undoubtedly endorse this plan as a country’s leader. Even the moral arguments against this strategy are limited. There’s only one thing to do now. Let’s go win a war.